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be a bad outcome given our nation's need to 
increase the domestic savings rate to finance the 
installation of productivity-improving capital in our 
businesses, and to lessen our dependence on for­
eign sources of finance. Again, more broadly and 
alternatively, there are many small changes in 
scheduled benefits and system revenues that can be 
made together, so that Social Security can be put on 
a financially sustainable base for the long run, 
without the need for increasing payroll taxes.3 
An appropriate, specific technical improvement 
to the current method of calculating the average 
wage index that would produce a fairer program is 
to use the earnings (wages and self-employment 
income) just of workers with earnings below a fixed 
percentile in the earnings distribution, say 94 per­
cent, reflecting historical norms.4 More fundamen­
tally, a better approach to guide the structure of 
Social Security payroll taxes in reform proposals is 
to eschew arbitrary goals, like the one targeting 
total taxable earnings to be 90 percent of aggregate 
earnings. Instead we should tie the type and levels 
of revenues used to fund the Social Security pro­
gram with the design and purpose of a universal 
government program providing modest levels of 
retirement, survivors, and disability insurance. Fair­
ness is an appropriate consideration here, and sug­
gests both tying the benefit earned to the amount 
paid in, as well as some redistribution of retirement 
resources to those with low lifetime earnings. Re­
distribution itself should also be done fairly, how­
ever, unlike the deficit reduction commissions' 
proposals. 
3My suggestion summarized in a recent article is one such 
proposal. "A Pro-Growth and Progressive Social Security Re­
form Proposal," Tax Notes, Jan. 12, 2009, p. 283, Doc 2008-26247, 
or 2009 TNT 7-51. (For a full description and score of the 
proposal, see http:/ /www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency, memo 
dated Sept. 17, 2008.) It includes raising the normal retirement 
age gradually, including state and local government workers in 
the program, reforming the disability insurance program, and 
so on. 
4Note also that this fix would have prevented the recent 
mistake by the SSA in the calculation of the average wage index 
whereby a few erroneous tax form filings purporting astronomi­
cal earning levels were entered into the system and skewed the 
published average wage index until an external source reported 
the error, and the SSA did a correction. (For prior coverage, see 
Tax Notes, Nov. 8, 2010, p. 735, Doc 2010 -23596, or 2010 TNT 
215-6.) 
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The tax treatment of intellectual property receives 
surprisingly little attention despite intellectual prop­
erty's important role in the economy. In this article, 
Maine and Nguyen evaluate the fairness of the intel­
lectual property tax system, identifying differences in 
the tax treatment of what appear to be similar trans­
actions. The authors argue that disparate tax treat­
ments between seemingly similar owners indicate 
potential flaws in the tax system. This article draws on 
the authors' recent collaboration, "Equity and Effi­
ciency in Intellectual Property Taxation," 76 Brooklyn 
L. Rev. 1 (2010). 
Introduction 
The code contains several special provisions gov­
erning valuable intellectual property assets, such as 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Some of these 
special provisions address a large group of intellec­
tual property assets1; most, however, address only a 
specific type of intellectual property.2 Although 
these special tax rules were largely designed to 
address the shortcomings of traditional taxation 
principles in the intellectual property context,3 
many special tax rules are circumscribed in ways 
that relegate the tax analysis back to these tradi­
tional principles. Thus, the income tax system gov­
erning intellectual property is a mix of special tax 
rules and general tax principles. 
Ideally, the intellectual property tax system 
should embrace the principle of fairness. Tax fair­
ness is usually described in terms of horizontal 
equity, which requires that persons who are simi­
larly situated be taxed in a similar fashion.4 A 
1See, e.g., sections 167(g)(6), 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) and (m), and 197. 
2See, e.g., sections 41, 167(f)(1), 167(g)(8), 174, 263A(h), 
1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, and 1253. 
3See Xuan Thao Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Maine, "The History 
of Intellectual Property Taxation: Promoting Innovation and 
Other IP Goals?" 64 SMU L. Rev. _ (2010) (forthcoming). 
4See John A. Miller and Maine, The Fundamentals of Federal 
Taxation 4 (2d ed. 2010); Michael J. Graetz and Deborah H. 
Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 28 (6th ed. 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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related concept is that economically equivalent ac­
tivities should be taxed in the same manner even if 
they differ in form.5 Under horizontal equity, two 
patent owners who are similarly situated, or two 
copyright owners whose situations are similar, 
should be taxed in a similar fashion. 
The utility of horizontal equity in tax policy 
analysis has come under attack in recent years.6 
Some critics point to the difficulty in determining 
relevant likeness (that is, the comparison of tax­
payers and economic activities).7 Requiring equal 
tax treatment for equals, they argue, begs the ques­
tion of what equals actually are. For example, is the 
seller of a copyright on a novel equal to a seller of a 
copyright on a song? This criticism, however, rests 
on an ‘‘exaggerated view of the level of precision 
required in order for equality to have meaning.’’8 As 
suggested by one commentator, ‘‘horizontal equity 
is concerned with individuals who are ‘similarly 
situated,’ not with those who are ‘identically situ­
ated.’’’9 Moreover, even if this criticism of horizon­
2009). For early treatments, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory 
of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy 160 (1959) (‘‘Perhaps 
the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation is that 
people in equal positions should be treated equally’’); Henry C. 
Simons, Federal Tax Reform 11 (1950) (‘‘Equity in this primary 
sense must, in an advanced nation, predominate over, if not 
wholly override, all other objectives’’); see also Joseph T. Sneed, 
‘‘The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy,’’ 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567, 
574-580 (1965).
5See Jeffrey H. Kahn, ‘‘The Mirage of Equivalence and the 
Ethereal Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity,’’ 57 
Hastings L.J. 645, 647 (2006) (using the term ‘‘parallelism’’ for the 
proposition that ‘‘the same or equivalent receipts, expenditures 
or losses should be treated the same by the tax law’’); Eric M. 
Zolt, ‘‘The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation,’’ 16 Va. Tax Rev. 
39, 49 (1996) (using the term ‘‘uniform taxation,’’ which rests on 
the concept of horizontal equity, ‘‘to refer to tax treatment in 
accordance with some general approach . . .  without any differ­
entiation as to type of income or type of taxpayer ’’).
6See generally Paul R. McDaniel and James R. Repetti, ‘‘Hori­
zontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange,’’ 
1 Fla. Tax Rev. 607 (1993); see also Anthony C. Infanti, ‘‘Tax 
Equity,’’ 55 Buff. L. Rev. 1191, 1193-1194 (2008); Eric M. Zolt, ‘‘The 
Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation,’’ 16 Va. Tax Rev. 39, 89-97 
(1996) (summarizing criticisms of horizontal equity).
7McDaniel and Repetti, supra note 6, at 612-613; Zolt, supra 
note 6, at 95 (‘‘Defining horizontal equity as requiring equal tax 
treatment for individuals who are, in all relevant aspects, equal 
accomplishes little. It just begs the question of what is 
relevant. . . . The  principle of horizontal equity does nothing to 
determine which differences justify different tax treatment’’).
8John A. Miller, ‘‘Equal Taxation: A Commentary,’’ 29 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 529, 545 (2000) (‘‘All of our major tax schemes have found 
ways to determine likeness (or difference) that are generally 
recognized as fair ’’).
9David Elkins, ‘‘Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax 
Theory,’’ 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 43, 44 (2006) (‘‘Tautologically, any 
conceivable tax arrangement will treat identically situated tax­
payers equally. . . . Taxpayers are similarly situated when their 
situations are considered equivalent’’). 
tal equity is valid, horizontal equity can still serve 
as a useful tool to uncover potential problems in the 
intellectual property tax regime.10 To use the ex­
ample above, the tax system’s different treatment of 
literary copyrights and musical copyrights might 
signal a flaw in the intellectual property tax system, 
or it might at least challenge us to justify disparate 
treatment.11 
This article evaluates the intellectual property tax 
regime in terms of horizontal equity. In the eight 
examples that follow, we highlight differences in tax 
treatment of what appear to be similar intellectual 
property transactions. We believe that many of 
these tax distinctions lack theoretical justification, 
suggesting legislative or administrative changes 
may be warranted. Ideally, the government should 
establish a sound basis for making tax distinctions 
for intangible intellectual property rights if distinc­
tions are to be adopted and maintained. 
Unequal Tax Treatment of IP Development 
Example 1: Patent Development. Inventor A 
and Inventor B each spend $100 to develop a 
patented invention. Inventor A plans to enter a 
future business of her own with her developed 
technology and market the technology herself. 
Inventor B, however, plans to license her de­
veloped technology to a company that will 
market the developed technology to its cus­
tomers. 
Inventor A and Inventor B appear similarly situ­
ated; each spends $100 and each obtains patent 
protections for similar technologies that will be 
exploited in the commercial marketplace. Never­
theless, under the present tax system, Inventor A 
and Inventor B are not treated equally. Inventor A 
may deduct $100 in research costs, but Inventor B 
may not. 
This disparate treatment stems from section 174, 
which allows a deduction for research expenditures 
10See Kahn, supra note 5, at 651. 
11Many commentators have recently defended horizontal 
equity as an important principle of tax theory despite the 
criticisms noted above. See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, ‘‘The 
Easy Case Against Tax Simplification,’’ 22 Va. Tax Rev. 645 (2003) 
(arguing that equity and efficiency, as opposed to simplicity, are 
core values); Elkins, supra note 9 (showing independence of 
horizontal equity as a principle of tax theory); Brian Galle, ‘‘Tax 
Fairness,’’ 65 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1323, 1328, 1335-1362 (2008) 
(providing justifications for tax fairness and claiming that 
horizontal equity ‘‘can be defended as an essential feature of the 
revenue function of taxation’’ and can operate on principles of 
its own); Kahn, supra note 5 (recognizing that equal treatment of 
the same items serves the normative goal of fairness, but 
arguing that parallelism need not necessarily prevail over other 
legitimate goals); Miller, supra note 8 (discussing the merits of 
horizontal equity analysis). 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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incurred ‘‘in connection with’’ the inventor’s ‘‘trade 
or business.’’12 While a taxpayer need not be cur­
rently conducting a business (that is, producing or 
selling any product) for research expenditures to 
meet section 174’s trade or business requirement,13 
courts have required that a taxpayer show a realistic 
prospect of entering into a trade or business in the 
future that will exploit the technology under devel­
opment.14 To do so, the taxpayer must demonstrate 
both an objective intent to enter into the trade or 
business and the ability to perform the business.15 
In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a Tax 
Court decision that denied deductions to a com­
puter software developer who did not market the 
developed technology himself, but instead licensed 
the technology to another company for use in that 
company’s trade or business.16 A few Tax Court 
decisions have held that research activities, and 
exploitation of the resulting inventions by sale or 
license, may constitute a trade or business.17 These 
12Section 174(a). A current deduction is not available under 
section 162 because of section 263. Section 263(a); reg. section 
1.263(a)-4.
13Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503-504 (1974). 
14See Kantor v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 
1993) (‘‘The taxpayer must demonstrate a ‘realistic prospect’ of 
subsequently entering its own business in connection with the 
fruits of the research, assuming that the research is successful’’); 
see also Zink v. United States, 929 F.2d 1015, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991); 
Spellman v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 148, 149-150 (7th Cir. 1988); 
Stauber v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-128; Diamond v. Com­
missioner, 92 T.C. 423, 439 (1989), aff’d, 930 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 
1991).
15See Kantor, 998 F.2d at 1518-1519 (holding that the partner­
ship possessed neither ‘‘the objective intent nor the capacity of 
entering such a business’’ at the time it incurred research 
expenditures); Diamond, 930 F.2d at 375 (‘‘The question is not 
whether it is possible in principle, or by further contract, for [the 
taxpayer] to engage in a trade or business, but whether, in 
reality, the [taxpayer] possessed the capability in the years 
before the court to enter into a new trade or business in 
connection with the ‘‘products being developed’’); Glassley v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-206, Doc 96-12999, 96 TNT 86-10 
(denying section 174 deductions for expenditures to develop 
jojoba plants and seeds because taxpayer had neither intent nor 
capability to enter jojoba farming business).
16Saykally v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-152, Doc 2003­
13075, 2003 TNT 102-11, aff’d, 247 F. App’x 914 (9th Cir. 2007). 
17See Kilroy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-489 (permitting 
deductions when actions, over a period of years, relating to 
inventing activities suggested taxpayers were engaged in the 
trade or business of inventing); Louw v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1971-326 (1971) (permitting deductions since taxpayer’s 
freelance inventive activities were of sufficiently sustained 
character to qualify as engaging in a trade or business of an 
inventor); see also Avery v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 538, 542 (1942) 
(permitting business deductions when taxpayer ‘‘held the pat­
ents [to his inventions] for sale or license to others for profit’’). 
cases, however, involved inventors that had devel­
oped several inventions.18 
The unequal tax treatment of the novice inven­
tors in the example highlights a fundamental prob­
lem with section 174; namely it fails to recognize the 
importance of technology licensing in today’s 
economy and favors only inventive activities of a 
sufficiently sustained character. 
Example 2: Copyright Creation. ABC Inc. 
spends $100 to develop copyrighted books. 
EFG Inc. spends $100 to develop copyrighted 
software. XYZ Inc. spends $100 to create copy­
righted package designs used in advertising. 
In general, costs incurred in creating works that 
are subject to copyright protection are not deduct­
ible but must be capitalized.19 Congress has carved 
out a narrow exception for specified costs incurred 
by individual writers, photographers, and artists 
when engaged in their trades.20 As a result, ex­
penses incurred by an individual author in writing 
a book are deductible, but similar creative costs 
incurred by a book publishing company (costs of 
writing, editing, and designing) must be capital­
ized. 
Although corporate taxpayers must generally 
capitalize copyright creation costs, capitalization is 
not required if the subject of copyright protection is 
computer software21 or certain advertising materi­
als.22 As a result, a corporation may not deduct the 
costs of developing copyrighted books, films, or 
songs, but it may deduct the costs of developing 
18See Kilroy, T.C. Memo. 1980-489 (‘‘numerous patents’’); 
Avery, 47 B.T.A. at 540 (‘‘about a dozen patents’’). But see 
Cleveland v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 1961) 
(deeming a single invention held by a joint venture to be 
sufficient).
19Section 174 does not apply to copyright creation expenses 
because those expenses do not constitute ‘‘research and experi­
mental expenditures’’ within the meaning of section 174. See reg. 
section 1.174-2(a)(1)-(3). Section 162 generally does not apply to 
copyright creation costs because the code requires such costs to 
be capitalized. Section 263(a), 263A(a)-(b); reg. section 
1.263(a)-4.
20Section 263A(h).
21Under a long-standing administrative ruling, software 
development costs are treated the same (currently deductible) 
regardless of whether the software is protected by patent, 
copyright, or trade secret. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, 
updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601, Doc 2000-31079, 
2000 TNT 233-11, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 2007-16, 
2007-1 C.B. 358, Doc 2006-25669, 2006 TNT 248-9. 
22As a general rule, the government allows taxpayers to 
deduct advertising costs currently even though advertising 
often produces benefits that continue well beyond the current 
tax year. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57; RJR Nabisco Inc. v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-252, Doc 98-21920, 98 TNT 131-5 
(allowing trade dress and copyright development costs incurred 
in an advertising campaign to be deducted). 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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copyrighted software and graphic designs and 
package designs used in advertising. 
In short, legislative and administrative exceptions 
to the general asset capitalization rule produce dif­
ferent tax results depending on the status (indi­
vidual or corporation) of the copyright creator and 
in some cases, on the nature of the property em­
bodying the copyright. The result in the example is 
that ABC cannot currently deduct its copyright cre­
ation costs, but EFG and XYZ may. Ironically, the 
value produced in each case lies not in the different 
tangibles embodying the copyrights, but in the in­
tangible copyright protections themselves.23 Never­
theless, even though the copyright protections are 
identical in each case, the tax consequences to the 
corporate creators differ significantly. 
Unequal Tax Treatment of IP Acquisition 
Inequities in the tax treatment of intellectual 
property acquisition costs are also prevalent. Under 
the current tax system, the costs of acquiring intel­
lectual property must first be capitalized24 and then 
are subject to numerous irrational tax depreciation 
rules.25 The methods and periods for recovering 
capitalized intellectual property acquisition costs 
vary by the type of intellectual property acquired, 
the manner of procurement, and even the method 
of payment. The depreciation rules for intellectual 
property raise some equity concerns, as illustrated 
in the two examples that follow. 
Example 3: Patent Purchase for Lump Sum 
Payment. Individual A purchases a patent for 
$100 as part of the acquisition of a business. 
Individual B purchases a similar patent for 
$100 (not part of the acquisition of a business). 
Prescribed cost-recovery periods for intellectual 
property range from three to 15 years, depending 
on the type of intellectual property acquired and the 
manner of procurement: 15 years for all acquired 
trade secrets, trademarks, and trade names26; 15  
years for patents, copyrights, and computer soft­
ware acquired with a trade or business27; five years 
23Copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right to make copies, 
prepare derivative works, distribute the copyrighted work, and 
publicly perform and display the work. See Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-433 (1984). 
24Section 263; reg. section 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i) and -4(c)(1) (‘‘A 
taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to another party to 
acquire any intangible [property] from that party in a purchase 
or similar transaction’’).
25Sections 197 and 167. For a critique of the tax system’s 
treatment of intellectual property acquisitions, see Nguyen and 
Maine, ‘‘Acquiring Innovation,’’ 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 775 (2008). 
26Section 197(a) and (d)(1)(F); reg. section 1.197-2(b)(5).
27Section 197(a) and (d)(1)(C)(iii); reg. section 1.197-2(b)(5). 
for separately acquired musical copyrights28; and 
three years for separately acquired computer soft­
ware.29 A fixed recovery period is not prescribed for 
patents and copyrights acquired separately.30 In­
stead, the capitalized costs of these assets are recov­
ered using one of two approaches: (1) over their 
estimated useful lives under the straight-line 
method, or (2) as income is actually earned from 
exploiting the asset under the income-forecast 
method (which has a maximum write-off period of 
11 years).31 
Under this framework, Individual A’s patent 
acquired as part of a business acquisition is subject 
to ratable 15-year amortization (which may be 
shorter or longer than the actual useful life of the 
patent), but Individual B’s patent acquired sepa­
rately benefits from more rapid depreciation allow­
ances (shorter useful life under the straight-line 
method or accelerated allowances under the 
income-forecast method). 
The disparate tax treatment between A and B 
raises some interesting questions: Is it logical that 
all patents — regardless of type or remaining useful 
life — acquired along with a business are grouped 
into a single category with the same recovery 
method and period, while patents acquired sepa­
rately are depreciated using an asset-by-asset ap­
proach? If patents derived their value from their 
relationship to a product, service, or goodwill of a 
28Section 167(g)(8)(A), amended by the Tax Increase Preven­
tion and Reconciliation Act of 2005, P.L. 109-222 (providing that 
a taxpayer may elect to ratably deduct the costs of acquiring any 
musical composition or any copyright regarding musical com­
position property over a five-year period instead of using the 
income-forecast method). Note the election does not apply for 
any tax year beginning after December 31, 2010. Section 
167(g)(8)(E).
29Section 167(f).
30Section 197(e)(3)-(4).
31For patents and copyrights acquired outside the context of 
a business acquisition, tax depreciation rules that were appli­
cable before 1993 generally continue to apply. Section 167; reg. 
section 1.167(a)-3(a) and -14(c). Under the income-forecast 
method, the depreciation allowance in any given year is com­
puted by multiplying the original acquisition cost by a fraction, 
the numerator of which is income from the intellectual property 
for the tax year and the denominator of which is forecasted total 
income to be earned in connection with the intellectual property 
during its useful life. See Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, 
supplemented by Rev. Rul. 64-272, 1964-2 C.B., supplemented by 
Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91. In 1997 Congress codified the 
income-forecast method of depreciation in section 167(g), pro­
viding a maximum recovery period of 11 years for income-
forecast property. Section 167(g), amended by the Small Business 
Job Protection Act of 1996, P.L. 104-188. Forecasted total income 
includes all income the taxpayer reasonably believes will be 
earned during the 11-year period beginning with the year the 
property is placed in service. Section 167(g)(1)(A) and (g)(5)(A). 
In the 11th year, a taxpayer may deduct any unrecovered costs 
left in the property. Section 167(g)(1)(C). 
(C)
 Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content. 
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business, as do trademarks or trade names, it might 
be justifiable to provide an arbitrary recovery pe­
riod to avoid messy valuation and intangible asset 
allocation problems. However, the value of a patent 
acquired as part of the purchase of a trade or 
business is not necessarily tied to the goodwill of 
the acquired trade or business.32 Rather, patents can 
be freely sold, assigned, or transferred without 
associated goodwill or other business assets. The 
same is true of copyrights. 
We believe that the depreciation schedule for 
patents, copyrights, and software need not neces­
sarily parallel the arbitrary depreciation schedule 
applicable to intangibles acquired in a business 
acquisition that lack inherent value (such as trade­
marks and trade names). Indeed, an argument 
could be made that if two patents or two copyrights 
are capable of reasonable valuation and have rela­
tively similar commercial lives, they should be 
subject to similar tax rules no matter how acquired. 
Example 4: Patent Purchase for Contingent 
Payments. ABC Inc. purchases a patent that 
has a remaining legal life of 18 years, as part of 
the acquisition of a trade or business. XYZ Inc. 
purchases a similar patent, which was not 
acquired as part of the acquisition of a busi­
ness. Both ABC Inc. and XYZ Inc. agree to pay 
their respective transferors contingent pay­
ments under identical, agreed-on formulas. 
As consideration, intellectual property buyers 
may make upfront principal payments, installment 
payments of a fixed amount, payments contingent 
on exploitation of the intellectual property, or use 
any combination of these. When contingent pay­
ments are made, depreciation rules differ depend­
ing on whether the intellectual property is acquired 
with a trade or business or acquired separately. 
Under current tax rules, if a contingent payment is 
made for a patent acquired with a business, the 
contingent amount is written off over a 15-year 
period.33 If, however, a contingent payment is made 
for a patent acquired separately, the contingent 
32Trademarks, in part, derive their value from goodwill. See 
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, sec­
tions 2:18-19 (4th ed. 2008). The value of patents, however, stems 
from the owner’s ability to ‘‘exclude others from making, using, 
selling, or offering for sale the invention within the United 
States’’ for a set number of years. 5 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on 
Patents, section 16.01 (2010). 
33Reg. section 1.197-2(f)(2)(i) (‘‘Any amount that is properly 
included in basis of an amortizable section 197 intangible after 
the first month of the 15-year period . . . and  before the expira­
tion of that period is amortized ratably over the remainder of 
the 15-year period’’). 
amount is fully deductible in the year paid.34 As can 
be seen, ABC Inc. and XYZ Inc. in the example 
above are treated vastly different for tax purposes, 
even though both appear to be similarly situated. 
The apparent rationale behind permitting an 
immediate deduction for separately acquired pat­
ents is that each contingent payment reflects the 
annual cost of the patent and a current deduction 
properly matches expenses with income.35 How­
ever, the same policy can support deductions for all 
contingent payments, regardless of whether the 
patent is acquired separately or with a trade or 
business. Any concerns about valuing intangibles 
acquired in a business acquisition or allocating the 
purchase price among acquired intangibles should 
be nonexistent when contingent payments are in­
volved. 
Unequal Tax Treatment of IP Dispositions 
Like the taxation of intellectual property devel­
opment and acquisition costs, the tax treatment of 
intellectual property transfers raises several equity 
concerns. Consider examples 5-8 below. 
Example 5: Patent Assignment. Individual A, 
a freelance inventor, sells one of his many 
developed patents to a third party for $100. 
XYZ Inc., a small research company that con­
ducts its own research, sells one of its many 
developed patents to a third party for $100. 
Although one would expect the tax system to 
treat Individual A and XYZ Inc. similarly, that is not 
the case. Individual A’s gain will be treated as 
capital gain under the section 1235 safe-harbor 
provision, while XYZ Inc.’s gain will be treated as 
ordinary income under the code’s general charac­
terization provisions.36 
Section 1235 requires that the transferor be a 
statutorily defined holder of the patent — that is, 
any individual whose personal efforts created the 
patent property — to be guaranteed capital gains 
34Under this approach, known as the variable contingent 
payment method of depreciation, a taxpayer adds the contin­
gent payment to the basis of the patent and then immediately 
takes a depreciation deduction for an equal amount. The 
government has sanctioned the variable contingent payment 
method. See reg. section 1.167(a)-14(c)(4); see also Associated 
Patentees Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 979, 985-987 (1945), acq., 
1959-2 C.B. 3; Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58 (following the 
Associated Patentees decision).
35Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. at 986 (concluding that a current 
deduction for the entire contingent payment gives the taxpayer 
‘‘a reasonable, and not more than a reasonable,’’ depreciation 
allowance).
36Section 1222 (requiring the sale or exchange of a capital 
asset for preferential capital gains treatment), section 1221(a)(1) 
(excluding inventory from the definition of capital asset), and 
section 1231(b)(1)(A) (excluding inventory from the definition of 
quasi-capital asset). 
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treatment.37 In this example, Individual A can 
qualify for capital gains treatment under section 
1235 even though the subject of the sale (the inven­
tory being sold) is not considered a capital asset 
under general characterization principles.38 XYZ 
Inc.’s assignment, however, will not qualify for 
section 1235 treatment but will instead be treated as 
a sale of a noncapital asset yielding ordinary in­
come. Although corporations do not get lower rates 
on their capital gains, these gains can be used by 
corporations to absorb capital losses that the corpo­
rations may have.39 
Section 1235 was enacted in 1954 with section 174 
primarily to encourage research activity and stimu­
late economic growth and technological develop­
ment.40 So why does section 1235 provide statutory 
assurance to individuals, but not corporations, that 
the sale of their patents will produce capital gains? 
Example 6: Copyright Assignment. A song­
writer sells one of his copyrighted songs for 
$100. A painter sells one of his copyrighted 
paintings for $100. 
Songwriters are subject to capital gains tax rates 
on the sales of their songs, rather than to higher 
personal income tax rates, because of a special code 
provision enacted in 2006 governing musical com­
positions and the copyrights on them.41 Peculiarly, 
capital gains treatment is not available to other 
individual artists such as novelists, painters, sculp­
tors, and designers because of the general rule 
enacted in 1950 that inventory and self-created 
works are not capital assets.42 Thus, the copyright 
creators in this example are treated vastly different 
for tax purposes even though the intangible legal 
protections assigned are similar. 
Special capital gains treatment for songwriters 
was a result of pressure from the country music 
37Section 1235(a) and (b)(1); reg. section 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i). An 
original inventor’s employer would not qualify as a holder 
‘‘even though he may be the equitable owner of the patent by 
virtue of an employment relationship with the inventor.’’ S. Rep. 
No. 83-1622, at 423 (1954).
38Section 1221(a)(1) (excluding from capital asset definition 
inventory and inventory-like property).
39Section 1211(a).
40See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 439 (1954) (stating that a policy 
goal underlying section 1235’s enactment was ‘‘to provide an 
incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the 
Nation’’).
41Section 1221(b)(3).
42Section 1221(a)(3) (excluding self-created copyrighted 
works from the definition of capital asset); section 1231(b)(1)(C) 
(excluding self-created copyrighted works from the definition of 
section 1231 property). 
industry.43 Apparently, songwriters make on aver­
age about $4,700,44 less money than other artists, 
and presumably need the benefit of a reduced 
capital gains rate (currently 0 percent at that level of 
income from songwriting). The problem with this 
thinking is that $4,700 of income is below the level 
at which any federal income tax is required; also, 
many songwriters have multimillion-dollar in­
comes that now enjoy a maximum 15 percent 
capital gains rate (in contrast to the current top rate 
on ordinary income of 35 percent). As Prof. Calvin 
Johnson has recently argued as part of the Shelf 
Project, this is unfair.45 
Example 7: Copyright Assignment. Indi­
vidual A sells copyrighted software that she 
created for $100. XYZ Inc. sells similar copy­
righted software that was created by its em­
ployees for $100. 
Although individual copyright creators have or­
dinary gain on the sale of their works (with the 
exception of musical copyrights, as noted above), 
corporate copyright creators may be eligible for 
capital gains treatment on the sale of works created 
by their employees and individual contractors.46 
This additional distinction arises because some au­
thority suggests the capital-asset exception for self-
created property does not apply to non-individual 
creators, such as corporations, the employees or 
independent contractors of which created the copy­
rights.47 These distinctions, like those identified in 
the examples above, seem to lack any theoretical 
justification. 
Example 8: Intellectual Property Charitable 
Donation. ABC Inc. donates intellectual prop­
erty worth $100 to a large university that will 
use the intellectual property in ways that will 
directly generate income. XYZ Inc. donates 
similar intellectual property worth $100 to a 
small college that emphasizes education and 
basic research. 
Before 2004 the tax code would have granted 
both companies an initial tax deduction for the 
43Brody Mullins, ‘‘Music to Songwriters’ Ears: Lower Taxes 
— Country Artists’ Group Presses Lawmakers to Slash the Levy 
on Lyricists,’’ The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 2005. 
44Id. (2005 estimates). 
45Calvin H. Johnson, ‘‘Cleaning Compensation for Services 
Out of Capital Gain,’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 11, 2010, p. 233, Doc 
2009-27878, 2010 TNT 9-5. 
46Sections 1221 and 1222. 
47See Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, superseded by Rev. Rul. 
62-141, 1962-2 C.B. 181 (applying inventory exclusion, but not 
copyright exclusion, suggesting that the copyright exclusion 
does not apply to works-for-hire creations); see also Desilu Prods. 
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1965-307 (same). 
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same amount — the fair market value of the do­
nated property.48 As a result of amendments in 
2004, however, the code does not grant either com­
pany an FMV deduction in the year of the gift.49 
Under current rules, the initial deduction for chari­
table gifts of any type of intellectual property is 
typically the property’s tax basis. Often the donor’s 
tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in 
many cases, the donor’s basis is zero because de­
velopment costs were deducted when incurred.50 
But that’s not the end of the story. To encourage 
charitable giving of intellectual property, Congress 
deemed it appropriate to grant donors of intellec­
tual property future charitable deductions based on 
the income received by the donee charity.51 Specifi­
cally, the donor can take a deduction for up to 10 
years for gifts of royalty-producing intellectual 
property to public charities, but the amount of the 
charitable deduction declines over time.52 
In this example, ABC Inc. will enjoy future chari­
table tax deductions equal to a percentage of the 
royalty income earned by its chosen donee, the 
commercially driven university. Because the small 
college’s use of XYZ Inc.’s donated intellectual 
property will not directly generate income, XYZ Inc. 
will receive no tax benefit for its charitable gift. In 
practice, charitable deduction rules favor intellec­
tual property used in applied research over similar 
intellectual property used for fundamental or 
purely scientific research, and favor donors who 
give to donees with the physical facilities, financial 
resources, and personnel capability to exploit intel­
lectual property solely for direct financial results.53 
Conclusion 
Intellectual property is subject to many tax in­
equities throughout its life cycle (development, 
acquisition, and transfer). Many of these inequities 
encourage intellectual property developers, pur­
chasers, and assignors to plan transactions that 
minimize taxes. For example, if a taxpayer identifies 
a business’s patent that it would like to purchase for 
contingent payments, the taxpayer receives greater 
immediate tax deductions if it can negotiate the 
purchase of the patent separately from the seller’s 
other business assets.54 Further, a taxpayer planning 
to donate income-generating intellectual property 
to a charity will receive larger tax deductions if it 
48Reg. section 1.170A-1(c); Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126.
49Section 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), amended by American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357. 
50See supra examples 1-2. 
51Section 170(m).
52Id. 
53For a critique of the 2004 changes, see Nguyen and Maine, 
‘‘Giving Intellectual Property,’’ 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1721 (2006). 
54See supra Example 4. 
donates the property to a donee that can use the 
intellectual property in ways that will directly gen­
erate income rather than to a non-commercially 
driven donee.55 These decisions should be tax neu­
tral, but under the present tax system, they are not. 
An optimal intellectual property tax system would 
not interfere with intellectual property owners’ 
economic behavior and would avoid dead-weight 
losses caused by the restructuring of intellectual 
property transactions to minimize taxes.56 
Several explanations can be offered for the un­
equal tax treatment of intellectual property. First, 
tax inequities may be inevitable because of the 
unique nature of intangible intellectual property 
rights. Compared with land, for example, intellec­
tual property rights involve such a broad range of 
economic activities that no two taxpayers will be 
situated similarly. Second, tax inequities may result 
when the tax system does not adequately respond 
to changing intellectual property policies and the 
realities of today’s economy. Tax rules enacted in 
the 1950s, for instance, may not adequately recog­
nize the evolution of intellectual property, the emer­
gence of new intellectual property forms, and 
modern intellectual property practices and trends. 
Third, tax inequities may be intentional. The design 
of any tax system involves trade-offs between vary­
ing tax policy goals. Thus, to achieve administrative 
efficiencies or to promote economic growth, the 
government may decide inequities are justifiable. 
A plausible explanation for many of the inequi­
ties identified in this report may be that tax rules 
governing intellectual property evolved in the ab­
sence of an appropriate legal framework for the 
intersection of the intellectual property and taxation 
schemes — one that considers the soundness of tax 
distinctions. Special tax rules governing intellectual 
property evolved slowly and separately from sub­
stantive intellectual property laws, and were de­
signed chiefly to enhance administrative efficiencies 
by resolving dissonance that occurred when tradi­
tional principles of taxation were used to resolve 
early tax disputes.57 An appropriate legal frame­
work for intellectual property taxation might con­
sider the following questions: Should the status of 
intellectual property owners (individuals versus 
corporations) dictate tax results? Should the 
methods of payment (lump sum versus contingent 
55See supra Example 8. 
56Graetz and Schenk, supra note 4, at 29 (stating that effi­
ciency requires a tax to interfere as little as possible with 
people’s economic behavior); Elkins, supra note 9, at 47 (stating 
that efficient taxes minimize dead-weight losses caused by 
taxpayer actions to reduce tax burden by choosing courses of 
action that minimize tax).
57See Nguyen and Maine, supra note 3. 
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payments) in intellectual property transfers matter 
in determining tax outcomes? And should the na­
ture of the tangible property embodying intangible 
intellectual property rights (book versus song) be 
relevant, or should tax results be determined based 
solely on the nature of intellectual property rights 
involved? 
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